本文(wen)選擇(ze)《經濟學人》雜(za)志2013年9月23日。譯文(wen)來自(zi)網絡。 原文(wen)鏈接：//www.economist.com/news/leaders/21586580-fakes-say-some-interesting-things-about-economics-art-emperors-new-pictures
WHAT makes an artist great? Brilliant composition, no doubt. Superb draughtsmanship, certainly. Originality of subject or of concept, sometimes. But surely true greatness means that the creator of a painting has brought a certain je ne sais quoi to the work as well. 是什么成(cheng)就了一(yi)名偉大的(de)(de)(de)畫(hua)家？出色的(de)(de)(de)構圖(tu)？高超(chao)的(de)(de)(de)畫(hua)技？這(zhe)兩點毋庸置疑。有時也靠創作主(zhu)題或理念的(de)(de)(de)新穎性。但真正的(de)(de)(de)偉大指的(de)(de)(de)是畫(hua)家為作品(pin)賦予一(yi)種難以描述的(de)(de)(de)特質(zhi)。
There is, however, a type of person who seems to sait perfectly well what that quoi is, and can turn it out on demand. In 1945, for example, a Dutchman named Han van Meegeren faced execution for selling a national art treasure, in the form of a painting by Vermeer, to Hermann G爀椀渀(ben), Hitler’s deputy. His defence was that it was a forgery he had painted himself. When asked to prove it by copying a Vermeer he scorned the offer. Instead he turned out a completely new painting, “Jesus Among the Doctors”, in the style of the master, before the eyes of his incredulous inquisitors. 然而，有這樣一(yi)種人，他(ta)們似乎能準(zhun)確(que)把握(wo)這個難以名(ming)(ming)狀的(de)(de)東西，并且能夠按要(yao)求把它復制出來。例如，1945年，一(yi)位名(ming)(ming)叫(jiao)漢·凡·米(mi)格倫(lun)（HanvanMeegeren）的(de)(de)荷蘭人因將一(yi)幅(fu)國家藝術珍品，也就是(shi)維(wei)米(mi)爾(er)(er)（Vermeer）的(de)(de)一(yi)幅(fu)畫(hua)作，賣(mai)給(gei)*的(de)(de)副手赫爾(er)(er)曼·戈(ge)林（HermannG爀椀渀(ben)）而面臨死(si)刑。他(ta)辯稱這只(zhi)是(shi)幅(fu)贗(yan)品，由他(ta)本(ben)人仿造。當被要(yao)求現場模仿一(yi)幅(fu)維(wei)米(mi)爾(er)(er)的(de)(de)畫(hua)作來證(zheng)明自己時，他(ta)表示十(shi)分不屑。在審判者懷疑的(de)(de)眼神下，他(ta)以維(wei)米(mi)爾(er)(er)的(de)(de)風格創(chuang)作了一(yi)幅(fu)全(quan)新的(de)(de)作品《基督在博學(xue)者中間》。
此處(chu)例子功能題：作者為何提及(ji)荷(he)蘭畫家(jia)？
G爀椀渀, who was facing a little local difficulty at the time, did not sue van Meegeren. But that has not been the experience of Glafira Rosales, an art dealer in New York who admitted this week that she has, over the past 15 years, fooled two local commercial art galleries into buying 63 forged works of art for more than $30m. She is being forced to give the money back, and is still awaiting sentence. 戈林當時在(zai)本國遇到了(le)(le)點麻煩(fan)，所(suo)以(yi)就沒(mei)有起訴凡·米格倫。但格拉菲拉·羅(luo)薩萊斯（GlafiraRosales）可沒(mei)那么好(hao)運了(le)(le)。作(zuo)為紐約的一位藝術品商(shang)人，羅(luo)薩萊斯于本周承認了(le)(le)在(zai)過去的十五年里曾向兩個當地(di)的商(shang)業藝術畫(hua)廊賣出了(le)(le)63幅假畫(hua)，總收益達三千多萬美元。她被強制要求退還所(suo)有收入(ru)，目前仍在(zai)等(deng)待法院的判決(jue)。
此處細節(jie)題，考(kao)有關Rosales 的例子內容(rong)。
Ms Rosales is guilty of passing goods off as something they are not, and should take the rap for the fraud. But although art forgers do a certain amount of economic damage, they also provide public entertainment by exposing the real values that lie at the heart of the art market. 羅薩萊斯女士因出售贗(yan)品獲罪，應(ying)承擔相應(ying)的刑事責任(ren)。但雖然這些藝術(shu)品偽造者(zhe)給他人造成了一定的經濟損失(shi)，但他們(men)也(ye)通過揭露藝術(shu)品市場上核心藝術(shu)品的真實價(jia)值而娛樂了大眾(zhong)。
此處(chu)詞匯理解題(ti)：解釋take the rap。
That art market pretends that great artists are inimitable, and that this inimitability justifies the often absurd prices their work commands. Most famous artists are good: that is not in question. But as forgers like van Meegeren and Pei-Shen Qian, the painter who turned out Ms Rosales’s Rothkos and Pollocks, show, they are very imitable indeed. If they were not, the distinction between original and knock-off would always be obvious. As Ms Rosales’s customers have found, no doubt to their chagrin, it isn’t. 藝(yi)(yi)術品市場(chang)稱偉大的(de)(de)(de)(de)藝(yi)(yi)術家(jia)都是(shi)獨一(yi)無二(er)的(de)(de)(de)(de)，而這種不(bu)可(ke)模仿(fang)性使得(de)他(ta)們(men)(men)的(de)(de)(de)(de)作品都貴得(de)離譜。大多數(shu)的(de)(de)(de)(de)藝(yi)(yi)術家(jia)都很優秀(xiu)，這一(yi)點毋庸置(zhi)疑。但像偽造者凡(fan)·米格倫和(he)(he)(he)為羅薩(sa)萊斯女(nv)士偽造羅斯科和(he)(he)(he)波洛克(ke)畫作的(de)(de)(de)(de)錢培琛，他(ta)們(men)(men)的(de)(de)(de)(de)存在證明(ming)了這些(xie)藝(yi)(yi)術家(jia)是(shi)可(ke)以被模仿(fang)的(de)(de)(de)(de)。如果不(bu)是(shi)的(de)(de)(de)(de)話，那真品和(he)(he)(he)贗品之間的(de)(de)(de)(de)差(cha)別就會十(shi)分(fen)明(ming)顯。羅薩(sa)萊斯女(nv)士的(de)(de)(de)(de)顧客就沒有(you)發現(xian)其中的(de)(de)(de)(de)區別，難怪事(shi)后(hou)他(ta)們(men)(men)懊惱不(bu)已(yi)。
此(ci)處句子(zi)理解(jie)題，解(jie)釋黑體字部分。chagrin: 懊悔，懊惱。
If the purchasers of great art were buying paintings only for their beauty, they would be content to display fine fakes on their walls. The fury and embarrassment caused by the exposure of a forger suggests this is not so. 如(ru)果購(gou)買者純粹是(shi)因為欣賞畫作的(de)美而去購(gou)買它，那(nei)么即使是(shi)把假(jia)畫掛在(zai)自家墻上也(ye)會心滿意(yi)足。但偽造者的(de)曝光所引起(qi)的(de)憤怒和尷(gan)尬說明(ming)了情況并非(fei)如(ru)此。
Expensive pictures are primarily what economists call positional goods—things that are valuable largely because other people can’t have them. The painting on the wall, or the sculpture in the garden, is intended to say as much about its owner’s bank balance as about his taste. With most kit a higher price reduces demand. But art, sports cars and fine wine invert the laws of economics. When the good that is really being purchased is evidence that the buyer has forked out a bundle, price spikes cause demand to boom. 名貴的(de)畫(hua)作被(bei)經濟學(xue)家(jia)稱為(wei)地位性(xing)商(shang)品——這類商(shang)品昂貴的(de)價值很大(da)程度(du)是(shi)因為(wei)其他人無法擁有。不管是(shi)墻上的(de)名畫(hua)，還(huan)是(shi)花(hua)園里(li)的(de)雕塑，都(dou)彰顯著(zhu)其主人的(de)品位和(he)財(cai)富。大(da)多數情況下，價格越高，需(xu)求就會越少。但是(shi)藝術品，跑車和(he)名酒卻打破了(le)這一經濟學(xue)定律。當(dang)真正被(bei)買(mai)下的(de)商(shang)品能證(zheng)明買(mai)家(jia)的(de)確是(shi)花(hua)了(le)大(da)手筆(bi)時，那(nei)么(me)價格的(de)上漲(zhang)反而(er)會使需(xu)求猛增。
All this makes the scarcity and authenticity that underpin lofty valuations vital. Artists forget this at their peril: Damien Hirst’s spot pictures, for instance, plummeted in value when it became clear that they had been produced in quantities so vast nobody knew quite how many were out there, and when the market lost faith in a mass-production process whose connection with the original artist was, to say the least, tenuous. 這個現象說(shuo)(shuo)明了(le)商品(pin)稀缺性(xing)和真實(shi)性(xing)的(de)重要性(xing)。正因(yin)為(wei)此，藝(yi)術(shu)品(pin)的(de)價(jia)格才(cai)會持續居(ju)高不下。藝(yi)術(shu)家(jia)若忽(hu)視這一(yi)點(dian)，便(bian)會自嘗(chang)苦果(guo)。例如，當(dang)達明安·赫斯特(te)（DamienHirst）的(de)現場畫作(zuo)被大(da)批(pi)量(liang)生(sheng)產時，其價(jia)格直(zhi)跌。市場對批(pi)量(liang)生(sheng)產過程失去了(le)信心，至(zhi)少可以說(shuo)(shuo)，這樣生(sheng)產出來的(de)作(zuo)品(pin)和原創者的(de)聯系不再緊密。
Ms Rosales’s career is thus a searing social commentary on a business which purports to celebrate humanity’s highest culture but in which names are more important than aesthetics and experts cannot tell the difference between an original and a fake. Unusual, authentic, full of meaning—her life itself is surely art, even if the paintings were not. 羅薩萊(lai)斯女(nv)(nv)士(shi)的(de)一生無非(fei)是對藝術行業的(de)嘲諷。這個行業聲稱頌揚(yang)人(ren)類崇高(gao)的(de)文(wen)化，但藝術家(jia)的(de)名字卻比(bi)美感更(geng)重要，而專家(jia)卻連真(zhen)品和贗品都無法區別開來(lai)。即使(shi)羅薩萊(lai)斯女(nv)(nv)士(shi)出售的(de)畫作不(bu)是真(zhen)正的(de)藝術品，但她的(de)一生，不(bu)同尋常、萬般真(zhen)實且意(yi)義深刻，充滿了(le)藝術性。 上半場閱讀理(li)解第(di)二篇：
In 1965, America’s big companies had a hell of a year. The stock market was booming. Sales were rising briskly, profit margins were fat, and corporate profits as a percentage of G.D.P. were at an all-time high. Almost half a century later, some things look much the same: big American companies have had a hell of a year, with the stock market soaring, margins strong, and profits hitting a new all-time high. But there’s one very noticeable difference. In 1965, C.E.O.s at big companies earned, on average, about twenty times as much as their typical employee. These days, C.E.O.s earn about two hundred and seventy times as much. 從第(di)二段開頭(tou)的the huge gap可以看出(chu)第(di)一(yi)(yi)段講的是兩種(zhong)經濟狀況(kuang)之(zhi)間的差(cha)距。這里也正好是第(di)一(yi)(yi)題的定位：The author makes a comparison between today’s America with that of 1965______.既(ji)然第(di)二段追究的是這種(zhong)gap的原因(yin)，那么(me)答案(an)就在第(di)一(yi)(yi)段結尾處：今天的CEO-雇員的收入(ru)差(cha)距比大(da)大(da)增(zeng)加了。
That huge gap between the top and the middle is the result of a boom in executive compensation, which rose eight hundred and seventy-six per cent between 1978 and 2011, according to a study by the liberal Economic Policy Institute. In response, we’ve had a host of regulatory reforms designed to curb executive pay. The latest of these is a rule, unveiled by the S.E.C. last month, requiring companies to disclose the ratio of the C.E.O.’s pay to that of the median worker. The idea is that, once the disparity is made public, companies will be less likely to award outsized pay packages. Faith in disclosure has been crucial to the regulation of executive pay since the nineteen-thirties, when companies were first required to reveal those figures. More recently, rules have made companies detail the size and the structure of compensation packages and have enforced transparency about the kinds of comparisons they rely on to determine salaries. The business press, meanwhile, now rigorously tracks executive pay. The result is that shareholders today know far more about C.E.O. compensation than ever before. There’s only one problem: even as companies are disclosing more and more, executive pay keeps going up and up.
這一(yi)段開(kai)頭黑體(ti)部(bu)分為我們(men)提示了一(yi)個(ge)關鍵字(zi)：disclosure. 由此(ci)可以看出本文的(de)話題是從(cong)收入差距說開(kai)去，轉向(xiang)CEO的(de)收入披露機制。
This isn’t a coincidence: the drive for transparency has actually helped fuel the spiralling salaries. For one thing, it gives executives a good idea of how much they can get away with asking for. A more crucial reason, though, has to do with the way boards of directors set salaries. As the corporate-governance experts Charles Elson and Craig Ferrere write in a recent paper, boards at most companies use what’s called “peer benchmarking.” They look at the C.E.O. salaries at peer-group firms, and then peg their C.E.O.’s pay to the fiftieth, seventy-fifth, or ninetieth percentile of the peer group—never lower. This leads to the so-called Lake Wobegon effect: every C.E.O. gets treated as above average. With all the other companies following the same process, salaries ratchet inexorably higher. “Relying on peer-group comparisons, the way boards do, mathematically guarantees that pay is going to go up,” Elson told me.
本段講到越是披露高(gao)管(guan)們的(de)收(shou)入(ru)，他(ta)們就(jiu)越能要求更(geng)高(gao)的(de)收(shou)入(ru)。
On top of this, peer-group comparisons aren’t always honest: boards can be too cozy with C.E.O.s and may tweak the comparisons to justify overpaying. A recent study by the labor economist Ron Laschever shows that boards tend to include as peers companies that are bigger than they are and that pay their C.E.O.s more. The system is also skewed by so-called “leapfroggers,” the few C.E.O.s in a given year who, whether by innate brilliance or by dumb luck, end up earning astronomical salaries. Those big paydays reset the baseline expectations for everyone else.
段首句是主題句：高管們(men)可能還會想方設(she)法隱(yin)瞞自己高增(zeng)長的收入。
This isn’t just an American problem. Elson notes that, when Canada toughened its disclosure requirements, executive salaries there rose sharply, and German studies have found something similar. Nor is it primarily a case of boards being helplessly in thrall to a company’s executives. Boards are far more independent of management than they used to be, and it’s notable that a C.E.O. hired from outside a company—who therefore has no influence over the board—typically gets twenty to twenty-five per cent more than an inside candidate. The real issues are subtler, though no less insidious. Some boards, in the face of much evidence to the contrary, remain convinced of what Elson calls “superstar theory”: they think that C.E.O.s can work their magic anywhere, and must be overpaid to stay. In addition, Elson said, “if you pay below average, it makes it look as if you’d hired a below-average C.E.O., and what board wants that?”
這個問題并不(bu)局限于(yu)美國(guo)，而是國(guo)際化的(de)。
Transparent pricing has perverse effects in other fields. In a host of recent cases, public disclosure of the prices that hospitals charge for various procedures has ended up driving prices up rather than down. And the psychological causes in both situations seem similar. We tend to be uneasy about bargaining in situations where the stakes are very high: do you want the guy doing your neurosurgery, or running your company, to be offering discounts? Better, in the event that something goes wrong, to be able to tell yourself that you spent all you could. And overspending is always easier when you’re spending someone else’s money. Corporate board members are disbursing shareholder funds; most patients have insurance to foot the bill.
收(shou)入披露在其他領域中也(ye)會(hui)引起一(yi)系列不良反應(ying)。
Sunlight is supposed to be the best disinfectant. But there’s something na瘀攀 about the new S.E.C. rule, which presumes that full disclosure will embarrass companies enough to restrain executive pay. As Elson told me, “People who can ask to be paid a hundred million dollars are beyond embarrassment.” More important, as long as the system for setting pay is broken, more disclosure makes things worse instead of better. We don’t need more information. We need boards of directors to step up and set pay themselves, instead of outsourcing the job to their peers. The rest of us don’t get to live in Lake Wobegon. C.E.O.s shouldn’t, either.
本文得出(chu)的(de)(de)結論是，SEC的(de)(de)規則的(de)(de)潛臺詞是，完全披露收入將會是各(ge)大公司不(bu)愿提高(gao)高(gao)管的(de)(de)薪(xin)水。 上半場閱(yue)讀理解第(di)三篇：
本文(wen)(wen)講(jiang)述全球人(ren)口(kou)(kou)增(zeng)(zeng)長(chang)問題。文(wen)(wen)章第一(yi)(yi)段(duan)提出(chu)(chu)了(le)(le)Sir David Attenborough 的(de)悲觀看法：100年后的(de)世(shi)界(jie)會出(chu)(chu)現(xian)各種問題，所以我們今(jin)天(tian)的(de)人(ren)類(lei)一(yi)(yi)定要做好準備，盡力(li)逆轉。第二(er)段(duan)用數(shu)字列舉了(le)(le)人(ren)口(kou)(kou)增(zeng)(zeng)長(chang)的(de)趨(qu)勢(shi)。第三、四兩段(duan)討(tao)論(lun)了(le)(le)解決人(ren)口(kou)(kou)增(zeng)(zeng)長(chang)問題的(de)conventioanal wisdom. 第五(wu)段(duan)提出(chu)(chu)非洲(zhou)的(de)新生兒死亡(wang)率大幅增(zeng)(zeng)加。第六段(duan)中，作(zuo)者(zhe)根據(ju)以上內容(rong)提出(chu)(chu)，世(shi)界(jie)人(ren)口(kou)(kou)停止增(zeng)(zeng)長(chang)的(de)日(ri)期應該(gai)早于2070年。而且無(wu)論(lun)如(ru)何(he)，讀者(zhe)無(wu)需(xu)為(wei)人(ren)口(kou)(kou)增(zeng)(zeng)長(chang)過快擔憂。第七段(duan)分析了(le)(le)耕地(di)和動物分布狀(zhuang)況，同樣(yang)得出(chu)(chu)了(le)(le)無(wu)需(xu)杞人(ren)憂天(tian)的(de)結論(lun)。后一(yi)(yi)段(duan)贊揚(yang)了(le)(le)非洲(zhou)的(de)進步(bu)會為(wei)人(ren)類(lei)生存環(huan)境的(de)改善加分。
題目解析：
第一題問(wen)作者為(wei)什么要提出Sir David Attenborough 的悲觀看法。
第二題圍(wei)繞birth control 的種種細節。
第三題要求考生解釋(shi)詞(ci)匯：as night follows day的(de)意思。
第四(si)題是新問法：四(si)個說法中哪一(yi)個與(yu)另外(wai)三(san)個不同?相當于NOT TRUE 體型(xing)。
第(di)(di)五(wu)題(ti)主(zhu)旨題(ti) 上半場閱(yue)讀理解第(di)(di)四(si)篇： 本(ben)文(wen)開(kai)頭便指(zhi)出(chu)Help to buy 政策(ce)(ce)等同于(yu)help to vote，由此可知，該篇文(wen)章屬于(yu)政治類。本(ben)文(wen)主(zhu)人(ren)公George Osborne 提(ti)出(chu)一項(xiang)(xiang)help to buy 政策(ce)(ce)，而本(ben)段接下來便說(shuo)(shuo)IMF和其(qi)他經濟觀(guan)察(cha)組織指(zhi)出(chu)這項(xiang)(xiang)政策(ce)(ce)十分瘋狂。第(di)(di)二、三(san)段中，作(zuo)(zuo)者為(wei)Osborne進行辯護，這項(xiang)(xiang)政策(ce)(ce)開(kai)始(shi)時的(de)(de)(de)確發(fa)揮了(le)(le)積(ji)極的(de)(de)(de)作(zuo)(zuo)用(yong)。而且(qie)他們的(de)(de)(de)團隊的(de)(de)(de)確積(ji)極推行。第(di)(di)四(si)段說(shuo)(shuo)英國財政部(bu)也積(ji)極配合，使(shi)得這個(ge)項(xiang)(xiang)目與房(fang)地(di)美和房(fang)利美有(you)本(ben)質(zhi)不同。第(di)(di)五(wu)段話鋒一轉，說(shuo)(shuo)這個(ge)項(xiang)(xiang)目很(hen)好的(de)(de)(de)證明(ming)了(le)(le)英國金融房(fang)地(di)產(chan)政策(ce)(ce)的(de)(de)(de)魯莽政策(ce)(ce)。并從幾個(ge)角度進行了(le)(le)具體分析。第(di)(di)六段說(shuo)(shuo)英國二三(san)十歲(sui)的(de)(de)(de)年輕人(ren)就開(kai)始(shi)希望擁有(you)房(fang)產(chan)，而其(qi)他幾個(ge)國家(jia)則(ze)普遍到四(si)十歲(sui)以后考慮買(mai)房(fang)子，并用(yong)數據支持。第(di)(di)七段引用(yong)經濟學家(jia)的(de)(de)(de)觀(guan)點(dian)說(shuo)(shuo)，國家(jia)補貼購房(fang)的(de)(de)(de)政策(ce)(ce)不僅為(wei)通貨膨脹(zhang)的(de)(de)(de)虛高的(de)(de)(de)房(fang)價推波助瀾，而且(qie)還會(hui)影(ying)響(xiang)到真正需要(yao)住房(fang)的(de)(de)(de)人(ren)。第(di)(di)八段說(shuo)(shuo)，新增(zeng)住房(fang)的(de)(de)(de)增(zeng)加只(zhi)會(hui)對目前awesome 的(de)(de)(de)房(fang)地(di)產(chan)存量雪(xue)上加霜。
題目解析：
第(di)一題(ti)請考生解(jie)釋help to vote 的意思。
第二(er)題(ti)是詞匯理解(jie)，問第二(er)段的(de)talisman 的(de)意思。
第三(san)題通過第五(wu)段的一句話考(kao)察對(dui)整段的理(li)解。
第四題問為什么作者(zhe)比較了(le)英國和其他(ta)幾個國家，用意何在。
第五題問(wen)后一段的段意(yi)。 下半(ban)場閱(yue)讀理解第一篇：
本(ben)(ben)文(wen)(wen)的(de)(de)(de)大話(hua)(hua)(hua)題(ti)是(shi)(shi)(shi)(shi)英(ying)國(guo)(guo)福利(li)制(zhi)度(du)(du)改(gai)革(ge)，也是(shi)(shi)(shi)(shi)我(wo)們在(zai)新東方高口課堂上反復提示大家的(de)(de)(de)重點話(hua)(hua)(hua)題(ti)。具體來(lai)說(shuo)，本(ben)(ben)文(wen)(wen)講(jiang)述(shu)英(ying)國(guo)(guo)的(de)(de)(de)殘(can)疾(ji)人(ren)福利(li)制(zhi)度(du)(du)。具體解(jie)析如下(xia)： 第(di)(di)一(yi)段(duan)開篇點出(chu)本(ben)(ben)文(wen)(wen)的(de)(de)(de)矛盾焦點所(suo)在(zai)：英(ying)國(guo)(guo)的(de)(de)(de)殘(can)疾(ji)人(ren)是(shi)(shi)(shi)(shi)不是(shi)(shi)(shi)(shi)過(guo)度(du)(du)依賴“multiple benefits”。第(di)(di)二段(duan)列舉了(le)一(yi)個長期靠呼吸機生(sheng)(sheng)(sheng)活(huo)的(de)(de)(de)long-term disabled認為，很(hen)(hen)多(duo)殘(can)疾(ji)人(ren)之所(suo)以(yi)處境悲(bei)慘(can)，就是(shi)(shi)(shi)(shi)因為system failure.第(di)(di)三段(duan)講(jiang)到英(ying)國(guo)(guo)將推(tui)行PIP制(zhi)度(du)(du)取代(dai)之前的(de)(de)(de)殘(can)疾(ji)人(ren)生(sheng)(sheng)(sheng)活(huo)補貼制(zhi)度(du)(du)，這就意(yi)味著(zhu)英(ying)國(guo)(guo)的(de)(de)(de)殘(can)疾(ji)人(ren)將受(shou)到評估。第(di)(di)四段(duan)講(jiang)到有很(hen)(hen)多(duo)輕(qing)度(du)(du)殘(can)疾(ji)的(de)(de)(de)人(ren)也能夠享受(shou)很(hen)(hen)多(duo)福利(li)政策。文(wen)(wen)章接(jie)下(xia)來(lai)描述(shu)了(le)上文(wen)(wen)那個殘(can)疾(ji)人(ren)的(de)(de)(de)生(sheng)(sheng)(sheng)活(huo)。 本(ben)(ben)文(wen)(wen)后(hou)面附上三個題(ti)目。第(di)(di)一(yi)題(ti)請考生(sheng)(sheng)(sheng)描述(shu)Dr Stephen Duckworth. 這是(shi)(shi)(shi)(shi)我(wo)們上課著(zhu)重練習的(de)(de)(de)定(ding)義模(mo)板。考生(sheng)(sheng)(sheng)需(xu)要(yao)寫出(chu)此人(ren)的(de)(de)(de)身份和他的(de)(de)(de)主(zhu)要(yao)觀點。重點應放在(zai)此人(ren)的(de)(de)(de)觀點上。 第(di)(di)二題(ti)請考生(sheng)(sheng)(sheng)解(jie)釋本(ben)(ben)文(wen)(wen)第(di)(di)一(yi)段(duan)中的(de)(de)(de)一(yi)個句(ju)子(zi)。因為這個考點是(shi)(shi)(shi)(shi)對第(di)(di)一(yi)段(duan)例(li)子(zi)的(de)(de)(de)總結，同時也引出(chu)文(wen)(wen)章的(de)(de)(de)話(hua)(hua)(hua)題(ti)，所(suo)以(yi)可(ke)以(yi)在(zai)第(di)(di)一(yi)段(duan)中進行paraphrase. 第(di)(di)三題(ti)是(shi)(shi)(shi)(shi)例(li)子(zi)功能題(ti)。定(ding)位在(zai)后(hou)一(yi)段(duan)的(de)(de)(de)結尾。考生(sheng)(sheng)(sheng)基本(ben)(ben)上總結出(chu)后(hou)一(yi)段(duan)的(de)(de)(de)內容即可(ke)。
下(xia)半場(chang)閱讀理解第(di)二(er)篇：
本文是(shi)環保類話題，關鍵詞是(shi)geo-engineering。全(quan)文如下： A former Government chief scientist once told me that we should always have a Plan B ready in case Plan A doesn’t work – or doesn’t happen. He was speaking in relation to the possibility of “geo-engineering” the climate if it becomes obvious that global warming is beginning to tip irrevocably towards a potentially dangerous state.
He could only say this once he was out of office of course because the official Government view at the time – as it is now – was that “there is no Plan B” in relation to climate change, that the only conceivable way of avoiding dangerous global temperature increases in the future is to curb the production of greenhouse gas emissions now.
Geo-engineering is defined as the deliberate, large-scale intervention in the Earth’s climate system in order to limit undesirable climate change, but it is seen by many as a technical fix too far. At its most outlandish, geo-engineering envisages putting giant mirrors in space to deflect incoming solar radiation, but it also includes more benign interventions, such as solar powered “artificial trees” in the desert for soaking up carbon dioxide in the air.
Despite the official view of there being no Plan B, however, last week’s fifth report by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) has placed geo-engineering firmly on the agenda – even if the scientific panel rather denigrates the idea as probably unworkable and potentially dangerous. Nevertheless, for some critics of geo-engineering the mere mention of the concept in such an official and high-profile publication is enough to see red.
Indeed, the Canadian-based ETC Group of environmentalists, perceived a Russian-led conspiracy to subvert the IPCC process. Russia had insisted on the addition of geo-engineering to the report and it is Russia where many geo-engineering projects are being tested, the ETC Group claims.
Before getting carried away with the inclusion for the first time of geo-engineering in an IPCC report, it is worth pointing out that the panel emphasises the inherent flaws of the proposals to counter rising temperatures. Deflecting sunlight with artificially created white clouds over the oceans, for instance, would do nothing to prevent the acidification of the oceans and, if it had to be stopped for any reason, global surface temperatures would soon rise again even higher than before.
In short, if we rely on a technical fix to combat climate change, rather than addressing the root problem, we could become addicted to the illusion that all is well when, in fact, all that we are doing is delaying the inevitable, while increasing the risk of some serious unintended consequences, which history tells us are never far away from big engineering proposals of this kind. Take for instance the relatively small-scale geo-engineering project to divert the rivers running into the Aral Sea of the former Soviet Union. Half a century ago the Aral Sea was the fourth largest lake in the world with a thriving commercial fishery, but by 2007 it had declined to about 10 per cent of its original size, with fishing boats stranded in the middle of a toxic salt pan. Soviet scientists diverted water from two rivers running into the Aral Sea to irrigate fields of cotton and other crops. But in the end they created a barren, dusty landscape where once there was a sea filled with wildlife. Toxins and salt blown from the Aral’s parched basement even threatened the very crops that the project was meant to generate.
So when some people talk about the possibility of “fixing” the climate with technological interventions rather than cuts in carbon dioxide emissions, let’s not forget history. Perhaps HM Government is right: there is no Plan B.
Talking of carbon dioxide, I have just returned from an interesting visit to the Czech Republic where health tourism, rather than being frowned upon, is positively encouraged.
What has this got to do with carbon dioxide, you may ask? Well one of the more curious, if not bizarre “medical” treatments you can buy is a dip in a dry bath of carbon dioxide. For 20 minutes or so you bathe everything below your waist (fully clothed) in an atmosphere of “natural” carbon dioxide pumped from underground sources.
It is said by those who sell it to cure a range of conditions and even acts like a dose of Viagra. Strictly in the interests of science I volunteered. I intend to publish my findings in a peer-reviewed scientific journal – that is if I can find one prepared to overlook my limited set of data points.
本文后附上(shang)三(san)(san)個題目： 1. What is geo-engineering? What are the possible international measures of geo-engineering? 2. What are the views of the critics of geo-engineering? 3. Why does the author introduce the small scale geo-engineering project? 從(cong)題目中可以(yi)看出，本文的(de)中心詞是(shi)geo-engineering，文章(zhang)(zhang)對geo-engineering還提(ti)出了(le)相當(dang)的(de)質疑，并(bing)提(ti)出可以(yi)實(shi)驗小型geo-engineering。從(cong)文章(zhang)(zhang)第三(san)(san)段開始，可以(yi)找到geo-engineering的(de)定義。接著正好是(shi)各國可以(yi)采用的(de)手(shou)段和人們(men)提(ti)出的(de)質疑。文章(zhang)(zhang)后三(san)(san)段相熟了(le)小型的(de)geo-engineering。 2014年3月高級口(kou)譯漢譯英答案(an)含解析(xi)
原文：
我們(men)認識(shi)到(dao)，改革(ge)是(shi)一(yi)場深刻的(de)(de)(de)革(ge)命，涉及重(zhong)大利益關系調整，涉及各方面體制機(ji)制完善(shan)。中(zhong)(zhong)國(guo)改革(ge)已進入攻堅(jian)期和深水區。這是(shi)因(yin)為(wei)，當前改革(ge)需(xu)要(yao)(yao)(yao)(yao)(yao)解決(jue)的(de)(de)(de)問題格外艱巨，都是(shi)難啃(ken)的(de)(de)(de)硬(ying)骨頭，這個時(shi)候就(jiu)要(yao)(yao)(yao)(yao)(yao)一(yi)鼓作氣，瞻前顧(gu)后、畏葸不(bu)(bu)(bu)前不(bu)(bu)(bu)僅(jin)不(bu)(bu)(bu)能(neng)前進，而且可能(neng)前功盡(jin)棄。 中(zhong)(zhong)國(guo)是(shi)一(yi)個大國(guo)，決(jue)不(bu)(bu)(bu)能(neng)在根(gen)本性問題上出(chu)現*性錯(cuo)誤，一(yi)旦出(chu)現就(jiu)無(wu)法(fa)挽回、無(wu)法(fa)彌補。我們(men)的(de)(de)(de)立場是(shi)膽子(zi)要(yao)(yao)(yao)(yao)(yao)大、步(bu)子(zi)要(yao)(yao)(yao)(yao)(yao)穩，既要(yao)(yao)(yao)(yao)(yao)大膽探索(suo)、勇于開(kai)拓，也要(yao)(yao)(yao)(yao)(yao)穩 妥審慎、三思而后行。我們(men)要(yao)(yao)(yao)(yao)(yao)堅(jian)持改革(ge)開(kai)放正(zheng)確方向，敢于啃(ken)硬(ying)骨頭，敢于涉險灘，敢于向積存(cun)多年的(de)(de)(de)頑瘴痼疾開(kai)刀，切實做到(dao)改革(ge)不(bu)(bu)(bu)停頓、開(kai)放不(bu)(bu)(bu)止步(bu)。
參考譯文：
We perceive the reform as a profound revolution, involving adjustment of relationships among major stakeholders and improvement of multiple systems and mechanisms. China’s reform has entered a phase of toughness and hardness. Confronted with the extraordinary difficulty in addressing problems in reforms, we need to gather all the courage and strength since hesitation will lead to no progress and even the deprivation of what we have accomplished. When it comes to fundamental issues, China, as a country of profound influences, can’t afford any subversive mistake, which would be irretrievable upon emerging. We should keep both courageous exploration and prudent actions based on the standpoint of bravery and steady progress. Marching in the correct direction of the reform and opening-up, we should dare to challenge hard nuts, tough situations and longstanding problems so as to achieve the persistence and eternity of the reform and opening-up.
【評析】
文本節選自習近平主席在亞太經合組織工商領導人峰會上的演講。此次演講中，他向世界展示了中國的改革強音，對于中國未來走向何方，如何深入貫徹改革進行了充分闡述。 原文對仗工整、富有文采，多用四字成語。在翻譯時不宜拘泥于原文結構和字面意義，應在理解原意的基礎上，按照英文的習慣，清晰表達段落意思。同時，考生還應注意譯文與原文文風的匹配，盡可能保留原文的氣勢。
